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SECURITY DETENTION, TERRORISM AND THE PREVENTION
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John P. McLoughlin,† Gregory P. Noone‡ & Diana C. Noone§
[T]he Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in 
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.  
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest 
is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Gov-
ernment believes to be dangerous. Even outside the exigencies of war, 
we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can 
justify detention of dangerous persons. 
—United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) 
The events of September 11 transformed the mission of the Depart-
ment of Justice . . . .  Indeed, the protection of our national security 
and the prevention of terrorist acts are our number one goal. On 
every level, we are now committed to a new strategy of prevention. 
—U.S. Department of Justice 
Counterterrorism White Paper  
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INTRODUCTION
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and many 
of its allies in the global campaign against terrorism have adopted a new 
dominant security imperative: prevention of terrorist attacks against their 
homelands and national interests. In succinct terms, the prevention impera-
tive posits that the U.S. will engage all elements of national power (legal, 
economic, diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, and information) to 
neutralize the threat posed by al Qaeda and other non-state actors. Detention 
of suspected terrorists has become a main facet of this prevention strategy, 
and several legal mechanisms have been employed in this regard in the U.S. 
The primary purpose of this article is neither to assess the rectitude 
or efficacy of the current multi-prong approach to detention of suspect indi-
viduals, nor to assess the imperative placed on prevention as a strategy. Ra-
ther, this article will review the recent calls for a new system of preventive 
detention and the legal landscape of preventive detention in the U.S., and 
will survey several preventive detention systems used by the U.S.’s allies. 
The goal of the article is to outline the likely characteristics of, and funda-
mental questions associated with, any new security detention process the 
U.S. might consider adopting.  
At the outset, this article is written with certain premises in mind. 
First, terrorism experts agree that the U.S. homeland likely will be the target 
of future attacks. Second, it is also likely that at some future point those 
attacks will be perpetrated by homegrown individuals, including U.S. citi-
zens.1 Third, the design of any system of preventive detention should be 
consistent with the U.S.’s obligations under both the U.S. Constitution and 
international law. Finally, it is better to discuss the controversial issue of 
preventive detention in a calm and deliberate manner rather than in the 
wake of another terrorist attack, when fear, anger, and calculations of politi-
cal advantage may rule the day.   
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO DETENTION OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS
The United States currently uses a multi-prong approach to detain 
suspected terrorists. As former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez ac-
knowledged, to many outsiders the U.S. government’s decision-making 
process about how to deal with a particular individual “is a black box that 
raises the specter of arbitrary action,” despite what he described as “a 
1 Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Okla-
homa City has already demonstrated this reality. 
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thoughtful, deliberate and thorough analysis of the relevant facts and law at 
many levels of the Executive branch.”2
One of the legal mechanisms that the U.S. has employed to detain 
suspects is traditional criminal law enforcement, which the U.S. has relied 
on to investigate and prosecute both terrorism-specific and other crimes. 
This reliance on criminal law enforcement procedures principally has in-
volved the “material support” statutes found at 18 USC §§ 2339A and 
2339B. More ordinary offenses such as conspiracy, document fraud, ob-
struction of justice, perjury, and the like also have played a critical role.3
This criminal law enforcement element of the prevention strategy has been 
used with respect to both U.S. citizens and aliens, and persons apprehended 
both in the U.S. and in foreign nations. The U.S. has employed other tools 
from the law enforcement paradigm more aggressively to neutralize per-
ceived terrorist threats.  Perhaps the most notable example is the use of the 
power to detain persons that qualify as material witnesses for ongoing crim-
inal investigations and prosecutions.4 Moreover, the U.S. and other nations 
have undertaken numerous measures, both in domestic and international 
law, to enhance the criminal law enforcement powers available to combat 
terrorism.   
In addition to the criminal law enforcement paradigm, the U.S. has 
expanded and employed its framework of immigration laws as an alternate 
detention mechanism. As in the arena of criminal law enforcement, the 
years since 9/11 have witnessed enhanced government powers and in-
2 Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Remarks before the American Bar Asso-
ciation Standing Committee on Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at 
http://fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/gonzales.pdf. 
3 See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Counterterrorism White Paper (June 22, 
2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepap 
er.pdf. 
4 The primary provision regarding material witnesses can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 3144 
(2006). For example, both Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, and Ali Saleh Kahlah al Marri, an 
alien resident in the U.S., were initially detained in 2001 as material witnesses for the inves-
tigation into the 9/11 attacks. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo; Nearly Half 
Held in War on Terror Haven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. Both were 
ultimately transferred to military custody and further detained as enemy combatants.  487 
F.3d at 165; Kirk Semple, Padilla Sentenced to 17 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2008. The U.S. government eventually transferred Padilla back to the ordinary civilian crim-
inal justice system, where he was tried and convicted for terrorism-related crimes that were 
unrelated to the original basis for his detention. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sen-
tences Padilla to 17 Years, Cites His Detention, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, at A3. Accord-
ing to the Washington Post, between September 2001 and November 2002, at least forty-four 
persons were detained as material witnesses in connection with terrorism investigations. 
Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo; Nearly Half 
Held in War on Terror Haven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. Of those forty-
four, twenty were never brought before a grand jury. Id. 
466 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:463 
creased enforcement operations with respect to foreign nationals.5 Although 
immigration laws and processes generally do not apply to citizens, immigra-
tion laws do apply to foreign nationals who legally have entered and resided 
in the U.S. for extended periods, not just illegal immigrants or those foreign 
nationals who are stopped at the border. 
A third—and in some quarters more controversial—legal mechan-
ism used to effectuate the prevention imperative is the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC). Framing the conflict with al Qaeda and its network of affiliates as 
a “global war on terror” and relying on the 2001 Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force (AUMF) adopted by Congress,6 the U.S. has cited the 
long-established customary and conventional power of nations to detain 
enemy combatants as the legal basis for holding many suspected terrorist 
operatives in military custody. This power, which permits a nation to hold 
enemy combatants for the duration of a conflict to prevent them from re-
turning to the battle, also has been asserted by the U.S. government to de-
tain both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, and with respect to both per-
sons detained in the U.S. and persons detained in foreign nations. 
Despite the availability and use of these multiple legal mechanisms, 
a growing number of prominent U.S. legal scholars and practitioners have 
suggested that the U.S. should enact a new system of security detention 
(also termed “preventive detention” or “administrative detention”). These 
scholars and practitioners suggest that the challenges facing the government 
under the current multi-prong approach, and the questions of fundamental 
fairness to some detainees under that approach, necessitate such a new sys-
tem. Moreover, these commentators have expressed concern that the current 
strategy is accomplished only by distorting these legal paradigms in ways 
that will ultimately spill over into government efforts to combat threats oth-
er than terrorism. 
5 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, 2, 15, 47 (2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. (stating that approximately 762 aliens were 
detained in the U.S. in connection with the 9/11 investigation).  By far, most of those aliens 
were detained under immigration provisions related to illegal entry or expired visas, and the 
overwhelming number of those charges were found to be invalid.  The vast majority of the 
detained aliens were never connected to terrorism, and prior to 9/11 many of them would not 
have been detained for those violations. Id.
6 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No., 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 1541). 
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A.  The Challenges of the Current Approach 
1. Shortcomings of old and new paradigms to combat terror threats  
Before 9/11, the United States and many other nations viewed ter-
rorism primarily as an issue of criminal law enforcement. Efforts to combat 
terrorism too often focused on post hoc criminal investigations that were 
designed to develop criminal cases for prosecution. Generally, post hoc 
criminal investigations often involve interdicting terrorist activity close to 
the point of attack, or, too frequently, after an attack has occurred, when 
evidence of offensive conduct and intent naturally is more unequivocal. 
This strategy largely permits shielding sensitive intelligence information—
including evidence from intelligence investigations—from disclosure during 
judicial proceedings.  
This approach might be understandable in response to a brand of 
terrorism that: (1) involves sporadic attacks; (2) limits civilian casualties 
(through advance warnings and the like) to insulate political agendas (e.g. 
the Marxist and nationalist terror groups of the 1970s); (3) primarily targets 
property interests (for example, modern eco-terrorists); (4) is secularly in-
spired; and (5) is almost exclusively domestic. However, this historical 
brand of terrorism has been joined, and to some extent eclipsed, by a fun-
damentally different terrorist threat, namely one perpetrated by religiously 
inspired radical extremist groups such as al Qaeda and its associated organi-
zations around the world. These modern terrorist groups employ a wide web 
of support for recruitment, procurement, logistics, and operational planning. 
They present a global terrorist threat interested in carrying out repetitive 
attacks involving indiscriminate mass casualties and severe damage to eco-
nomic and social infrastructure (including critical systems such as energy, 
communications, and food and water supplies). These groups have a ge-
nuine interest in the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
weapons, and a willingness, if not a desire, to die (through suicide or other-
wise) to achieve their mission.  
Just as the nature of the modern terrorist threat has evolved, so have 
the challenges of investigating and prosecuting that threat. Terrorist investi-
gations are increasingly multi-jurisdictional. Differences in capabilities, 
timeframes of action, judicial systems (accusatorial versus inquisitorial, 
common law versus civil law, and the like), willingness to cooperate, avail-
ability of resources, and enforcement authority create serious investigative 
obstacles. These obstacles make it far more difficult for government agen-
cies to obtain relevant, useful evidence while simultaneously increasing the 
time and cost of trying to do so. In addition, the global nature of modern 
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terrorism means that evidence may often be obtained under extraordinary 
circumstances or in extraordinary places.7
The forensic requirements of modern terrorism investigations are 
also far more complex and time consuming than in the past, particularly 
given the possibility of WMD hazards. The methodology of simultaneous 
attacks extends and complicates forensic examination and analysis, espe-
cially when the forensic sites are located in major metropolitan areas and 
infrastructure systems. Modern forensic investigations also require deploy-
ment of specialized teams, the number of which are limited and the func-
tions of which are often sequential in nature, meaning that parallel efforts 
are difficult, if not impossible.8
As a result of the changed threat environment and these investiga-
tive challenges, suspected terrorist activities must be disrupted earlier in the 
planning and preparation cycle. Terrorism investigations now are more of-
7 Operation Springbourne, an investigation by the British Metropolitan Police of a terror-
ism plot using ricin, provides a demonstration of obstacles to terrorism investigations. Con-
ducted between 2002 and 2005, Operation Springbourne spanned twenty-seven jurisdictions. 
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, TERRORISM DETENTION POWERS, 2005–06, H.C. 910-I, at 56, 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/910/910i. 
pdf. Because U.K. law required charging decisions within a short timeframe and evidence 
was not able to be developed from the many jurisdictions within that timeframe, the authori-
ties were unable to prosecute the suspects for terrorism charges. Id. Instead, the suspects 
were prosecuted for ordinary crimes such as fraud or forgery arising from some peripheral 
document and credit card fraud schemes. Id. A suspect later determined to be a prime conspi-
rator fled the country while on bail awaiting trial on the lesser charges. Id.
 8 For example, the July 2005 London bombings created the largest crime scene in the 
United Kingdom’s history—and it took place in the heart of London’s critical transport infra-
structure. See Minutes of Evidence Before the British H. of Commons Home Affairs Comm.,
Session 06 (2005) (testimony of British Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ian Blair and 
Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman to the British House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee) [hereinafter Minutes of Evidence], available at http://www.publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/462/5091305.htm. As of September 2005, law en-
forcement authorities had collected over 38,000 evidentiary exhibits. See id. The evidence to 
be preserved, collected, and analyzed included thousands of hours of closed circuit television 
(CCTV) videos and over 1,400 fingerprints. See id.  As the investigations expanded, over 
160 sites became potential crime scenes. See id. According to the British Metropolitan Po-
lice, one such site involved a so-called “bomb factory” discovered in the Yorkshire area. See
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 19. Investigators required over two weeks to 
secure safe access to the site, and examination required another six weeks. See id. Definitive 
forensic analysis of the explosive devices could not be completed before charging decisions 
were required under U.K. law, and thus a much more limited assessment of the device had to 
be used to interrogate the suspects prior to charge. See id. at 56–57. New technology also 
increases the time required for terrorism investigations. These investigations often involve 
seizure of large numbers (i.e., into the hundreds) of computer hard drives that store vast 
amounts of data. See id.at 18–19. That data must be secured, often decrypted, examined, and 
ultimately assessed prior to being incorporated into investigative interviews or other steps. 
Id. Many of these steps cannot be done simultaneously, and thus the time involved is neces-
sarily increased. See id. 
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ten viewed as intelligence cases, and prosecution of terrorist crimes is only 
one tool available to neutralize terrorist threats. However, the realities of 
intelligence pose serious problems. The key limit on intelligence is its in-
completeness; rarely does intelligence tell the whole story, and terrorists 
take proactive steps to secure and obscure information. Intelligence is spo-
radic, fragmentary, often inferential at best, and difficult to interpret. It re-
quires validation, prioritization, sifting, assessment and judgment. Intelli-
gence is also fragile. It comes from human sources who risk their lives to 
obtain it, and from sensitive technologies that can be countered by skilled 
and informed opponents. Highly dependable intelligence information may 
have been provided by a foreign government on the condition that the in-
formation, or the government’s cooperation, is not publicly disclosed.9
Statutes such as the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)10
provide limited relief for these concerns. To be sure, CIPA provides a valu-
able procedural mechanism for making determinations about the disclosure 
of national security information in criminal proceedings and to help “pre-
vent[] unnecessary or inadvertent disclosures of classified information.”11
CIPA accomplishes this goal through: pre-trial conferences; notice require-
ments; judicial protective orders; ex parte and in camera submissions; court 
authorized deletions, summaries and stipulations; pre-trial evidentiary hear-
ings; and interlocutory appeals. But CIPA “neither adds to nor detracts from 
the substantive rights of the defendant or the discoery [sic] obligations of 
the government.”12 Instead, it merely permits the government “to know in 
advance of a potential threat from a criminal prosecution to its national se-
curity . . . and advis[es] the government of the national security ‘cost’ of 
going forward.”13 Indeed, where a court rejects protective measures pro-
9 See Dame Eliza Mannignham-Buller, Dir. Gen., British Security Services, Address at 
the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/print/Page387.html [hereinafter Mannigham Speech]. 
10 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1–16 (1980). 
11 U.S ATTY. CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL, SYNOPSIS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
PROCEDURES ACT, HTTP://WWW.USDOJ.GOV/USAO/EOUSA/FOIA_READING_ROOM/USAM/TITLE
9/CRM02054.HTM [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY MANUAL]. 
12 Id.
13 Id. The ABA has concluded that CIPA 
provides procedures for notice to the government and judicial screening when the 
defendant wishes to reveal classified information. It is designed to limit the de-
fense’s ability to leverage its possession of classified information in plea negotia-
tions. CIPA provides no protection for information that the prosecution might need 
to introduce or for information that the defense is permitted to introduce. 
ABA TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Jan. 4, 2002, at 14, n.33. Thus, although “mechanisms exist to 
protect evidence of a classified nature from public exposure, these may not suffice to protect 
the information from the defendants and, through them, others who may use such informa-
tion to the harm of the U.S. and its citizens.” Id. at 14. 
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posed under CIPA, the government “ha[s] two options: (1) order the case to 
be dismissed; or (2) file an affidavit effectively prohibiting the use of the 
contested classified information. At that point, the court may impose sanc-
tions against the government, which may include striking all or part of a 
witness’s testimony, resolving an issue of fact against the United States, or 
dismissing part or all of the indictment.”14
Perhaps the most important aspect of this new paradigm is the criti-
cal dilemma it poses to both governments and societies alike. Specifically, 
how does a government protect its citizens within the rule of law when in-
telligence that is considered reliable does not meet the high evidentiary thre-
sholds developed by society in the context of ordinary criminal prosecu-
tions, and still protect the sources and methods essential to acquiring that 
critical information? For example, authorities could correctly believe that a 
terrorist attack is being planned, but the authorities must release any indi-
viduals arrested in connection with the suspected threat because the plan is 
too embryonic and vague to obtain criminal charges and convictions, or 
because the intelligence underlying the authorities’ belief is too sensitive to 
reveal the sources, methods, or technological capabilities that gave rise to 
the information.15 Accordingly, it may be in the best interest of society to 
14 Jim McAdams, The Classified Information Procedures Act: An Introduction and Prac-
tical Guide for Criminal Investigators (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.fletc.gov/training/prog 
rams/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/articles/the-classified-information-proced 
ures-act.html; see also, U.S. ATTORNEY MANUAL, supra note 11 (citing a specific example of 
where this issue might arise: the testimony of covert intelligence operatives). According to § 
2054 of the U.S. Attorney’s Criminal Resource Manual, the success of the intelligence com-
munity 
turns in significant part upon the ability of its intelligence officers covertly to ob-
tain information from human sources. In carrying out that task, the intelligence of-
ficers must, when necessary, be able to operate anonymously, that is, without their 
connection to an intelligence agency of the United States being known to the per-
sons with whom they come in contact. For that reason, an intelligence agency is 
authorized under Executive Order 12958 to classify the true name of an intelli-
gence officer. During the pre-trial progression of an indicted case, as the court en-
ters its CIPA rulings …, it may become apparent to the prosecutor that testimony 
may be required from an intelligence officer or other agency representative en-
gaged in covert activity, either because the Court has ruled under CIPA that certain 
evidence is relevant and admissible in the defense case, or because such testimony 
is necessary in the government's rebuttal. Just as the substance of that testimony, to 
the extent it is classified and is being offered by the defense, must be the subject of 
CIPA determinations by the court, the prosecutor must also ensure that the same 
considerations are afforded to the true names of covert intelligence community 
personnel, if those true names are classified information.  
Id.
15 See Manningham Speech, supra note 9. But see Minutes of Evidence, supra note 8 (tes-
timony of British Home Secretary Charles Clarke), available at http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/462/5091302.htm (observing that, in the weeks 
before the bombings, the U.K.’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center concluded that there was no 
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intervene in the absence of substantial admissible evidence in order to pre-
vent or disrupt a terrorist plot, even if the effect is to compromise a related 
criminal investigation and jeopardize follow-up prosecutions. 
Although the U.S. has prosecuted a number of terrorism cases in the 
ordinary criminal courts, many of the “successful” cases have involved 
highly unusual circumstances.16 Others cases only have succeeded in obtain-
ing convictions of significantly lesser charges,17 failed altogether,18 or in-
volved novel (some would say troubling) applications of the law. Moreover, 
despite U.S. efforts to prosecute some terrorist suspects before military 
commissions as unlawful combatants under the law of armed conflict, as of 
single terrorist group “with both the current intent and the capability to attack the UK,” and 
the threat level under which the authorities operated was reduced accordingly).  Home Secre-
tary Charles Clarke testified,“[I]ntelligence is not knowledge.” Id. Rather, intelligence is an 
effort to understand threats to a nation using a variety of techniques and sources, and then 
assessing the information gathered to come to a view. See id.
16 For example, Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber,” was prosecuted for attempting 
to detonate an explosive device on a trans-Atlantic commercial flight in December 2001. See
Indictment, United States v. Reid, 206 F.Supp.2d 132 (D. Mass 2002). The explosives were 
hidden in the soles of his shoes. Id. Had he succeeded in lighting one of the several matches 
he struck, Reid would have killed more than 180 innocent passengers and crew members. Id.
Reid ultimately pled guilty to virtually all charges, likening himself a soldier at war against 
the U.S., and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Richard Reid’s Response To Govern-
ment’s Motion To Vacate Or Modify Appointment Of Counsel For Defendant, United States 
v. Reid, 206 F.Supp.2d 132 (D. Mass 2002). Similarly, Zacarias Moussaoui also pled guilty 
to terrorism offenses related to the 9/11 plot. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, United 
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.Supp.2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003). Like Reid, Moussaoui used his 
trial to cast himself as a warrior against the U.S., and was ultimately sentenced to life impri-
sonment. Id.
17 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Statistics on Terrorism Faulted, WASH. POST, Feb. 
21, 2007, at A08 (explaining that Department of Justice Inspector General report shows that 
many terrorism-related cases result in charges on minor crimes or immigration violations 
unrelated to terrorism);  Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions 
on Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A01 (reporting that out of 200 terror-
ism-suspect convictions reviewed, only 39 convictions were for terrorism or other national 
security charges; most were for more ordinary crimes such as making false statements or 
immigration violations).  For an overview of U.S. terrorism-related prosecutions between 
2001 and 2006, see generally U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
18 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Leslie Eaton, Financing Mistrial Adds to U.S. Missteps in 
Terror Prosecution,  N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A16 (noting a larger percentage of terror-
ism prosecutions brought since 9/11 have been lost compared to pre-9/11 terrorism prosecu-
tions, in part because pre-9/11 terrorism convictions “were for completed acts of violence . . . 
or for conspiracies that were relatively close to fruition,” whereas post-9/11 prosecutions 
tend to be for less definitive activities, “reflective of a conscious change in Washington’s law 
enforcement strategy, to prevention from punishment”); Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of 
Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A1 (detailing lack of a single 
conviction in the trial of the Holy Land Foundation, one of the largest terrorist financing 
prosecutions in U.S. history); Eric Lichtblau, Setback for U.S. in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2005, at A1 (detailing failure of seventeen counts against former professor Sami al-
Arian for providing support and resources for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). 
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November 2008, only two such commissions have been completed. A series 
of challenges (many of them successful) to the legal basis and structure of 
the commissions are largely responsible for the failure of these efforts.19
2. Scholarly criticism of the current approach 
Concern for the difficulties facing investigators and prosecutors has 
led a growing number of commentators to conclude that the U.S. should 
consider adopting a new system of preventive detention, or perhaps some 
form of modified criminal process, for terrorism and other national security 
cases. Additionally, some commentators have suggested that the current 
seemingly ad hoc approach to detention of terrorism suspects poses more 
risk to civil liberty than the adoption of a formal system of preventive deten-
tion would pose.   
For example, Professors Jack Goldsmith (former head of the Office 
of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice) and Eric Posner have 
argued that the U.S. should abandon trials of terrorist suspects before mili-
tary commissions in favor of preventive military detention subject to more 
rigorous standards and enhanced oversight.20 Professor Goldsmith later con-
cluded, together with Professor Neal Katyal (counsel for the detainees in the 
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 21), that Congress should explicitly establish 
and sanction “a comprehensive system of preventive detention . . . that 
would . . . supplement the criminal process . . . [and] . . . would have greater 
legitimacy than our current patchwork system.”22
Similarly, prior to his current post as U.S. Attorney General, Mi-
chael Mukasey (a former Federal district court judge who handled several of 
the most prominent U.S. terrorism cases) wrote that Congress should delibe-
rate “how to fix a strained and mismatched legal system, before another 
cataclysm calls forth from the people demands for hastier and harsher re-
sults.”23 Mukasey urged Congress to consider proposals to create national 
security courts or to develop measures akin to civil commitment to “incapa-
19 See, e.g., William Glaberson, U.S. Seeks Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2008, at A1 (discussing military tribunal’s failure to begin any trials as of early 
2008).The only military commissions completed as of November 2008 were the guilty plea 
of the Australian David Hicks and the conviction of Salim Hamdan (a.k.a. “bin Laden’s 
driver”) for providing material support.   
20 See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Editorial, A Better Way on Detainees, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at A17.  
21 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
22 Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2007, at A19. 
23 Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, 
at A15. 
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citate dangerous people” suspected of involvement in terrorism.24 He 
reached this conclusion not simply as a result of the prosecutorial, financial 
and intelligence challenges faced by the government, but also because “if 
conventional legal rules are adapted to deal with a terrorist threat, whether 
by relaxed standards for conviction, searches, the admissibility of evidence 
or otherwise, those adaptations will infect and change the standards in ordi-
nary cases with ordinary defendants in ordinary courts of law.”25
Most recently, Professor John Farmer, a former Attorney General of 
the State of New Jersey and former senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, 
reviewed the terrorism-related prosecutions of Jose Padilla and others since 
9/11 for crimes such as material support and conspiracy, and determined 
that “[t]hey cry out for the creation of a form of preventive detention 
adapted to terrorism, and outside the criminal justice system.”26 Professor 
Farmer concluded that “the continued reliance on our criminal justice sys-
tem as the main domestic weapon in the struggle against terrorism fails on 
two counts: it threatens not only to leave our nation unprotected but also to 
corrupt the foundations of the criminal law itself.”27 According to Farmer, 
“[i]n order to make the criminal justice system an effective weapon [against 
terrorism], we have already started extending the reach of criminal statutes 
to conduct that has never before been punishable as a crime,”28 and  
[t]he urgency involved in terrorism cases has also led courts to accept con-
duct by the government that might well have been disapproved in other 
contexts . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . When terrorism cases are treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions, the 
principles of law that they come to embody will guide law-enforcement 
conduct and be cited by the government not just in terrorism cases but in 
other criminal contexts.  
Over time, we may well transform the law of conspiracy to the point 
where an agreement alone is a crime. This would render thoughts punisha-
ble, reward government overreaching and erode our civil liberties. All be-
cause the criminal law is being used not primarily to punish crimes but for 
purposes of detaining people we are worried about.29
24 Id. 
25 Id.
26 John Farmer, Op-Ed., A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, ¶ 4, at 
14.
27 Id. 
28 Id.
29 Id. 
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3.  Judicial responses to the current approach 
Apprehension about stretching the bounds of established legal doc-
trines to fit difficult terrorism matters has surfaced in a number of recent 
cases both in the U.S. and abroad. The increasingly broad scope of the ma-
terial support and conspiracy doctrines used in cases such as Padilla, which 
gave rise to Mr. Mukasey’s and Mr. Farmer’s commentaries, is just one 
example. Indeed, the federal court that handled the criminal prosecution of 
Jose Padilla ultimately imposed a significantly shorter term of imprisonment 
than that requested by U.S. prosecutors, at least in part because, in the 
court’s view, the evidence did not link Padilla to any specific act of terror-
ism.30
A related concern centers on the growing tendency to criminalize 
conduct that is ever more remote from the actual commission of a terrorist 
attack or conduct that is not supported by sufficient proof of terrorist intent. 
Earlier this year a court of appeal in the United Kingdom reversed the con-
victions of five young Muslim students prosecuted for “possess[ing] an ar-
ticle in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that [it was 
possessed] for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or 
instigation of an act of terrorism,”31 contrary to Article 57 of the U.K.’s 
Terrorism Act 2000.32 The articles included documents, compact discs and 
computer hard drives that contained extremist religious and political propa-
ganda (described by the prosecution as al Qaeda recruiting material) and 
communications that allegedly revealed a plan by the men to travel to Pakis-
tan and receive terrorist training.33 Among the articles was a martyrdom 
song, a letter from one of the men saying he had left to take part in warfare, 
a military manual, and communications with a contact in Pakistan about 
how to travel without raising suspicion.34 The British court ruled that, de-
spite the potentially broad scope of the statutory language: 
It was necessary for the prosecution to prove first the purpose for which 
each appellant held the [articles at issue] . . .  and then to prove that this 
purpose was “connected with the commission, preparation or instigation” 
of the prospective acts of terrorism relied on by the prosecution . . . . 
. . . . 
30 See Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term For Role in Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2008, at A14. (“In explaining her decision, [the judge] . . . questioned the effects of the 
conspiracy, saying that there was no evidence linking Mr. Padilla and two co-defendants to 
specific terrorism acts anywhere.”). 
31 E.g., Zafar v. Regina [2008] EWCA (Crim) 184, [15] (Eng.).  
32 Id. at [49]. 
33 Id. at [1], [40], [44]. 
34 Id. at [1], [8]. 
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We have concluded that, if section 57 is to have the certainty of meaning 
that the law requires, it must be interpreted in a way that requires a direct 
connection between the object possessed and the act of terrorism. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he prosecution’s case [suggested] that a much looser connection be-
tween the material possessed by the appellants and the terrorist act … 
would suffice to establish the appellants’ guilt.35
Another example of judicial pushback occurred in the June 2007 
case of al-Marri v. Wright.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit examined whether military detention of terrorist suspects 
designated as enemy combatants could be extended to a foreign national 
who legally entered and resided in the U.S. prior to his detention37—a doc-
trine that the Supreme Court affirmed in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 
2004.38 Al-Marri was originally arrested and charged with several crimes in 
the civilian criminal justice system,39 but before his case went to trial, al-
Marri was transferred to military custody pursuant to a Presidential Order 
determining that, among other things, al-Marri was an enemy combatant in 
possession of intelligence that would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks by 
al Qaeda.40
35 Id. at [24], [29], [34]; See also Five Students Win Terror Appeal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 
2008 (discussing Appellate Court decision). 
36 Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).  
37 See id. at 164. 
38 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 519 (2004). 
39 See Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 164. Al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, entered the U.S. on Sep-
tember 10, 2001, and resided legally in the State of Illinois. Id. He was originally arrested by 
civilian authorities in the U.S. as a material witness to the 9/11 investigation and eventually 
indicted for several domestic crimes. Id. None of the charges against al-Marri were terror-
ism-specific crimes; instead, he was charged with more general crimes that often arise in 
terrorism investigations, such as “possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit card num-
bers with intent to defraud . . . making false statements to the FBI [and] . . . on a banking 
application, and . . . using another person’s identification for the purpose of influencing the 
action of a federally insured financial institution.” Id. “Al-Marri pleaded not guilty to these 
charges.” Id.
40 See id. at 164–66 (“The declaration of Jeffery N. Rapp, Director of the Joint Intelligence 
Task Force for Combatting Terrorism . . . asserts that al-Marri: (1) is ‘closely associated with 
al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization with which the United States is at war’’; (2) 
trained at an al Qaeda terrorist training camp . . . ; (3) in the summer of 2001, was introduced 
to Osama Bin Laden by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed; (4) . . . volunteered for a ‘‘martyr mis-
sion’’on behalf of al Qaeda; (5) . . . enter[ed] the United States sometime before September 
11, 2001, to serve as a ‘‘sleeper agent’’ to facilitate terrorist activities and explore disrupting 
this country’s financial system through computer hacking; (6) . . . met with [and received 
funds from] terrorist financier; (7) gathered technical information about poisonous chemicals 
. . . (8) undertook efforts to obtain false [and stolen] identification, credit cards, and banking 
information . . . ; (9) communicated with known terrorists including, Khalid Shaykh Mu-
476 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:463 
The court’s answer was an emphatic “No.” According to the court, 
even assuming all of the allegations about al-Marri’s conduct were true, the 
government had no authority to treat al-Marri as an enemy combatant or as 
anything other than a civilian.41
If the government accurately describe[d] al-Marri’s conduct, . . .  [he 
could] be returned to civilian prosecutors, tried on criminal charges, and, if 
convicted, punished severely. But the government cannot subject al-Marri 
to indefinite military detention.  For in the United States, the military can-
not seize and imprison civilians—let alone imprison them indefinitely.42
Given the level of concern of courts, legal scholars and practitioners 
alike, perhaps it is time to re-examine the issue of preventive detention in 
the U.S. in the context of terrorism. 
B. The Legal Landscape of Preventive Detention in the United States 
Preventive detention refers to the detention or confinement of a per-
son believed to pose a threat to national security or to public safety and or-
der, or a person whose presence at a public proceeding is required but can-
not be guaranteed.43 The purpose of the detention is avoidance of the poten-
tial danger or absence rather than the punishment of a criminal offense. Al-
though many, if not most, people held under some form of preventive deten-
tion are in fact criminal defendants, others may not have been accused of 
crimes.44
Some might suggest that preventive detention necessarily infringes 
fundamental principles of both U.S. Constitutional law and international 
hammed and Al-Hawsawi, by phone and e-mail; and (10) saved [jihadist] information . . . on 
his laptop computer . . . Rapp [did not allege] that al-Marri [was] a citizen, or affiliate of the 
armed forces, of any nation at war with the United States . . . [or] directly participated in any 
hostilities against United States or allied armed forces.”). 
41 See id at 164. The Fourth Circuit later vacated the panel decision and reviewed al-
Marri’s case en banc.  The en banc court held: (1) assuming the government’s allegations 
about al-Marri’s conduct were true, Congress had authorized his detention as an enemy com-
batant; but (2) al-Marri had not been afforded sufficient process to challenge his designation 
as an enemy combatant.  Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(reversing the district court and remanding for further proceedings). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has recently agreed to review the al-Marri case during the 2008 term. See Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court to Hear Case of Accused Al-Qaeda Member, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 
A2. 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (discussing rationale behind 
preventive detention). 
44 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 518–19 (2004). 
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law.45 Others might contend that preventive detention is a widely accepted 
practice that is thoroughly consonant with the concept of ordered liberty.46
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Multiple sources of legal authority 
govern the standards and conditions of detention, including domestic law, 
international human rights law, and, in certain circumstances, the law of 
armed conflict (also called international humanitarian law).47 Preventive 
detention by its very nature therefore has one foot in the international legal 
world and one in the world of domestic law.   
The basic instruments of international human rights law neither ex-
plicitly permit nor prohibit preventive detention, although they do establish 
certain basic substantive and procedural standards relevant to the issue. 
Most important is the freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and the 
requirement that arrest, detention and other deprivations of liberty must be 
for lawful grounds and according to established legal procedures.48 Further, 
anyone arrested or detained has a right to: (1) information about the grounds 
underlying the deprivation; (2) independent proceedings to determine the 
lawfulness of the detention; and (3) freedom from torture or any other form 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.49 The law of 
armed conflict provides for many similar detainee rights.50
45 See, e.g., Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 163–64 (stating the court’s view that al-Marri’s deten-
tion violated constitutional principles). 
46 See id. (discussing the Government’s perspective that it had the authority to detain al-
Marri).
47 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 216 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Gene-
va Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 972 U.N.T.S. 
1950, 4 Bevans 852 [hereinafter POW Convention]. 
48 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47. 
49 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 5, 8, 9, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess. 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 21, 1948); ICCPR, supra note 47, at arts. 7, 
9(1), 9(2), 9(4); Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of De-
tention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, principles 2, 4, 6, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 
(Dec. 9, 1988); United Nations Convention Against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, arts. 2(1), 
16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. Note that, except for the 
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, each of the freedoms and 
rights mentioned may be subject to derogation if necessary during times of officially proc-
laimed public emergency. See ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 4.  
50 The Geneva Conventions permit internment of prisoners of war in international armed 
conflicts until the cessation of hostilities. See POW Convention, supra note 47, arts. 4, 21, 
118. The Geneva Conventions also provide for review by a “competent tribunal” of the basis 
for prisoner of war status “[s]hould any doubt arise.” Id. at art. 5. The Geneva Conventions 
permit the internment of certain civilians when necessary for security, and provide for recon-
sideration or appeal of such decisions (and further periodic review) by an appropriate judicial 
or administrative body. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, arts. 42, 43, 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herei-
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More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or 
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the 
Due Process] Clause protects.”51 As a result,   
government detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the deten-
tion is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protec-
tions, or in certain special and narrow non-punitive circumstances where a 
special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs 
nafter Civilian Persons Convention]. The law of armed conflict also prohibits torture and 
other inhumane treatment of combatants and civilians both in international and non-
international armed conflict. See POW Convention, supra note 47, arts. 3(1), 13, 17; Civilian 
Persons Convention, supra, arts. 27, 31, 32, 37. Further, whereas the provisions of both 
international human rights treaties and law of armed conflict treaties may be limited in their 
application based on the terms of the treaty (for example, many provisions of human rights 
treaties do not strictly apply to State activities outside the territory of the State at issue), 
customary international law outlines certain fundamental human rights guarantees that bind 
all states, in all circumstances. See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations Information Service, 
Prohibition of Torture “Absolute” U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9373, OBV/428 (June 18, 2004) avail-
able at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/sgsm9373.html. These rights gen-
erally are understood to include freedom from “prolonged arbitrary detention” and “torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL,
UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 6-1, 6-2 (2000); THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS &
LAW 127–28 (2002). As a statutory matter, U.S. law explicitly forbids any cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment (including torture) of detainees in U.S. custody regardless of their geo-
graphical location, and prohibits the U.S. Department of Defense from interrogating detai-
nees in any manner not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual on Military Interroga-
tions. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 
(2005).  In September 2006, the U.S. Army replaced the Field Manual on Military Interroga-
tions with a new Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collection Operations, which prohibits 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FM 2-22.3 viii (2006).  It also contains a list of inter-
rogation techniques that are specifically forbidden, including sexually humiliating acts, hood-
ing, infliction of physical pain, “water-boarding,” and the use of military working dogs to 
instill fear. Id. at 5–21. Nevertheless, the issue of detainee treatment persists, in part because 
the U.S. government asserts the right of agencies other than the Department of Defense (e.g., 
the Central Intelligence Agency) to use unspecified enhanced interrogation techniques 
beyond those in the Field Manual, provided they do not constitute torture or mistreatment as 
defined by the U.S. government. See, e.g., Pamela Hess, House Fails to Override Torture 
Veto, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 11, 2008; Dan Eggen, Bush Announces Veto of Water-
boarding Ban, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2008, at A02; George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 
Text of the President’s Weekly Radio Address (Mar. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080308.html.
51 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 
80 (1992)). 
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the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical re-
straint.52
A statutory bias against emergency detention of citizens also has 
existed in the U.S. since 1971 when Congress enacted the Non-Detention 
Act as part of legislation that repealed the earlier Emergency Detention 
Act.53 The Non-Detention Act plainly states that “[n]o citizen shall be im-
prisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an 
Act of Congress.”54
As the Supreme Court indicated, the U.S. has recognized several 
exceptions to the general rule against detention of individuals absent the 
ordinary protections afforded a criminal defendant. The fundamental nature 
of the liberty interest involved compels that such exceptions be fairly li-
mited. As such, preventive detention in the U.S. is a more recent, circum-
scribed power (both substantively and procedurally)55 than many would 
prefer to accept, particularly in cases that do not involve post-charge, pre-
trial detention of a criminal defendant. 
1. Pre-trial detention 
For most of the 20th Century, preventive detention was largely li-
mited to criminal defendants awaiting trial for murder, criminal defendants 
who posed a flight risk, insane persons and other dangerous incompetents, 
and those with infectious diseases.56 Other serious criminal defendants con-
sidered dangerous to the community may have been placed under de facto
preventive detention through the imposition of high bail amounts, but the 
general practice in criminal proceedings was to set bail and provide condi-
tional release pending trial. In the 1970s, state and local governments in-
creasingly instituted preventive detention for criminal defendants accused of 
52 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted) (original emphasis omitted). This fundamental right to due process finds its origin in 
both the Fifth Amendment guarantee against deprivations of liberty without due process of 
law and the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, IV. 
53 LOUIS FISHER, DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS, 1 (2005). The Emergency Detention Act, 
which provided procedures for emergency executive detention of individuals deemed likely 
to engage in espionage or sabotage, was adopted in 1950 during another period of intense 
national security concerns. Id.
54 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1948). 
55 “[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, 
wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (internal quotation omitted). 
56 One example of preventive detention that does not fit this mold is the Japanese intern-
ment cases from World War II.  Although these cases have been largely discredited, they 
have not been formally overruled. 
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dangerous or violent crimes, and in 1984 Congress passed the Federal Bail 
Reform Act,57 which authorized pre-trial preventive detention for defen-
dants accused of a much broader range of violent crimes and other demon-
strably dangerous defendants.   
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention provisions 
of the Act in United States v. Salerno,58 in which the defendants were 
charged with numerous violent racketeering and organized crime offenses. 
Reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found 
that the Bail Reform Act satisfied both substantive and procedural due 
process concerns.59 Pre-trial detention imposed under the Act was regulato-
ry (administrative) in nature rather than punitive; it served not to punish the 
defendant but to prevent danger to the community—a legitimate and com-
pelling regulatory goal.60 Though seemingly indefinite, detention under the 
act was limited to a pre-trial period, which was not excessive relative to the 
purpose of the detention.61 The Act also provided for a prompt judicial hear-
ing—at which the detainee had the right to request counsel, testify, present 
evidence, confront witnesses, and from which he could appeal—to deter-
mine the propriety of detention.62 Moreover, the Act, which required hold-
ing a defendant apart from the ordinary prison population to the extent poss-
ible, reserved detention for “individuals who have been arrested for a spe-
cific category of extremely serious offenses” and whose danger had been 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.63
In the wake of Salerno, the U.S. now regularly permits pre-trial 
preventive detention of a wide range of dangerous criminal defendants, and 
57 Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150 (1984).
58 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
59 See id. at 752–55. 
60 Id. at 747. 
61 See id. at 747. The Speedy Trial Act limits the length of the pre-trial detention. Id. 
62 Id. at 739. 
63 Id. at 747–752. Of course, in the U.S. pre-trial detention differs in one critical way from 
the other bases for preventive detention discussed in this article, as all pre-trial defendants 
have at least been charged with a criminal offense on the finding of probable cause to believe 
that the defendant committed the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006). The U.S. is not the only 
system to permit extended pre-trial detention of dangerous criminal defendants; for example, 
in the terrorism context both France and Spain permit pre-trial detention of up to four years. 
See HOME OFFICE, TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FRENCH EXAMINING MAGISTRATES 
SYSTEM 7 (2007) (“In France, the period of pre-trial detention can last up to 4 years.”); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN: PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL 
DETENTION (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/9.htm (explain-
ing that persons accused of serious crimes “may be held in pre-trial detention for up to 4 
years”).  
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pre-trial preventive detention is routinely available for federal criminal de-
fendants charged with terrorism-related offenses.64   
2. The mentally ill and recidivist sex offenders 
Due Process also permits preventive detention for certain classes of 
persons in the U.S. other than pre-trial criminal defendants, notably those 
who are mentally impaired and, more recently and more controversially, 
recidivist sex offenders.65 A review of the seminal case law surrounding 
64 The Bail Reform Act now includes a rebuttable presumption in favor of pre-trial deten-
tion of any person accused of a “federal crime of terrorism” (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§2332b(g)(5)(B)) for which a prison term of ten years or more is applicable.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3142(e) (2006). The Supreme Court has also upheld pre-trial preventive detention of juvenile 
criminal suspects considered to present a danger to the community.  See Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253 (1984). An issue related to, but distinct from, pre-trial detention is pre-charge 
detention.  In the past several years, the United Kingdom has extended the pre-charge period 
during which terrorist suspects may be detained in connection with criminal investigations.  
Recent legislation in the United Kingdom allows terrorist suspects to be detained for up to 
twenty-eight days before charges must be filed or the detainee released. See Terrorism Act, 
2006, c. 11 (Eng.), § 23.  
65 The U.S. is not the only country to have enacted legislation permitting the civil deten-
tion of the mentally ill, sexual offenders and other criminals who continue to pose a danger 
after their criminal sentences are completed.  For example, in 2003 the parliament of Queen-
sland, Australia enacted the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, which autho-
rizes a court to order post-sentence imprisonment of serious sexual offenders where the court 
has found reasonable grounds to believe the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offense if 
released. See Patrick Keyser & Sam Blay, Double Punishment? Preventive Detention 
Schemes Under Australian Legislation and Their Consistency with International Law: The 
Fardon Communication, 7 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L. (2006). In early 2008 France adopted a 
new law permitting the continued detention of certain dangerous criminals even after they 
served their full sentence. See French Pass Bill on Lifelong Internment for Deranged Co-
victs, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.monstersandcritic
s.com/news/europe/news/article_1385786.php/French_pass_bill_on_lifelong_internment_for
_deranged_convicts. Inspired by a 2007 kidnapping and rape of a 5-year-old boy by a 61-
year-old sexual predator, the law originated as a measure to be applied only to persons con-
victed of serious crimes against children. Id. However, the final law passed applied to anyone 
convicted of a broader range of serious crimes and subject to imprisonment for 15 years or 
more. Id. The law establishes a multi-disciplinary commission including medical and legal 
professionals to make the detention determination. Id. Detention is renewable each year 
without limit. Id.; see also Press Release, Amnesty International, France: Amnesty Interna-
tional’s Concerns on ‘Preventive Detention’ Bill (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.amnestyusa.org 
/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGEUR210022008 (discussing human rights concerns related 
to France’s preventive detention bill). Similarly, in 2004 Germany enacted legislation per-
mitting post-sentence detention of those convicted of a crime against life, bodily integrity, 
personal freedom, or sexual self-determination when facts “indicate a considerable danger 
from the prisoner for the general public.” Andrew A. Hammel, Preventive Detention in 
Comparative Perspective, in ANNUAL OF GERMAN & EUROPEAN LAW VOLUME II & III, at 89–
115 (R. Miller & P. Zumbanse, eds., Berghahn Books 2006) (discussing and quoting §66b of 
the German Penal Code), available at http://works.bepress.com/andrew_hammel/1. Such 
detention can be ordered by a court “if a complete evaluation of the prisoner, his crimes, and 
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these doctrines, however, indicates that the circumstances justifying preven-
tive detention are quite limited. 
In Addington v. Texas the Supreme Court upheld the preventive de-
tention of a mentally incapacitated person upon a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person posed a danger to himself or to others, 
and where the person was entitled to a periodic release hearing.66 Detention 
could continue provided the person remained mentally ill and continued to 
pose a danger to society.67
Foucha v. Louisiana68 highlighted the limits of the Addington doc-
trine by holding that due process prohibits the continued detention of a per-
son who ceases to suffer from mental illness, even if he continues to pose a 
danger to the community. According to the Court, the continued detention 
of Foucha bore no “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the indi-
vidual was committed,”69 namely mental disease or illness, regardless of his 
dangerousness. Moreover, the statute at issue failed to provide substantive 
and procedural safeguards of the kind identified in Salerno.70
Another area where the Supreme Court has permitted preventive de-
tention involves violent sex offenders, particularly those convicted of 
crimes involving children. Starting mainly in the 1990s, many U.S. states 
adopted new civil commitment laws for sexual predators who continued to 
pose a danger after completing their criminal sentences. In Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, the Court considered one such statute and found it satisfied the Con-
stitution’s due process requirement, both substantively and procedurally.71
The statute required a “special justification” beyond mere dangerousness 
and so applied only to “a small segment of potentially dangerous individu-
als,” and it also provided “strict procedural safeguards.”72 Although the sta-
tute did not require the finding of a mental illness to justify civil commit-
ment, the Court held that the statute required some form of mental abnor-
mality or anti-social personality disorder, thus limiting detention to individ-
uals with “volitional impairment[s] rendering them dangerous beyond their 
control.”73 Further, it provided stringent procedural safeguards including: 
. . . his development during prison confinement reveal, that with a high probability he will 
commit serious crimes, through which the victims will be seriously psychologically or bodily 
injured.” Id. at 97.   
66 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
67 Id. at 426. 
68 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
69 Id. at 78. 
70 See id. at 71–72. The Supreme Court has also permitted detention of dangerous defen-
dants who become mentally incompetent before trial. See Id.
71 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). 
72 Id. at 368. 
73 Id. at 358–59.  
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(1) an initial finding of probable cause to believe that person is a dangerous 
sexual predator; (2) an independent professional evaluation of the individu-
al; and (3) a full trial on the merits of the question.74 The individual pos-
sessed the right to counsel (funded if necessary) and the right to a jury.75
3. Aliens 
One area where preventive detention has received more deference 
from the courts is under immigration laws. Despite the lack of an explicit 
Constitutional power to control immigration, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
found that the power to exclude or deport aliens is inherent in the concept of 
a sovereign nation.76 The Court has also consistently held that potentially 
dangerous aliens may be detained pending removal proceedings,77 much as 
dangerous criminals may be held pending trial pursuant to Salerno.   
The Court has not reached these conclusions because aliens are 
wholly without Constitutional rights. Although the Constitution ordinarily 
does not protect aliens in foreign territory,78 it does provide some rights to 
aliens who have entered and developed substantial connections with U.S. 
74 Id. at 352–53. The statute required proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial. Id.
75 Id. at 352–59; Kansas Inpatient SVP Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59–29a01. In a subsequent 
case, the Court had occasion to clarify the special factor that permitted detention of sexual 
predators. According to the Court, the Constitution does not “permit[] commitment of the 
type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control de-
termination. Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing a danger-
ous sexual offender subject to civil commitment ‘from other dangerous persons who are 
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings’ . . . The pres-
ence of what the ‘psychiatric profession itself classifies[] . . . as a serious mental disorder’ 
helped to make that distinction in Hendricks.  And a critical distinguishing feature of [the 
serious mental disorder in Hendricks] consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to 
control behavior. . . . [W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, ‘inability 
to control behavior’ will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to 
say that there must be proof of serious difficult in controlling behavior. And this . . . must be 
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist con-
victed in an ordinary criminal case.” Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002) (internal 
citations omitted). 
76 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–
06 (1889) (“[The power of the government to] exclude aliens from its territory is a proposi-
tion which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that 
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is part of its independence.”); Fong Yue 
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that the right to deport foreign aliens 
already in the country “rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the 
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country”).  
77 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524–26 (2003). 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (U.S. 
Constitution has no force “in foreign territory unless in respect of our citizens”). 
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territory.79 Most provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and other individual rights in the Constitution, including the Due 
Process Clauses, apply to “persons” rather than “citizens.” 80 Accordingly, 
these rights generally protect aliens present in the U.S. as well as citizens.  
However, due process guarantees in immigration proceedings are 
not equivalent to those applicable in criminal proceedings. Immigration 
proceedings “are civil, not criminal, and . . . are nonpunitive in purpose and 
effect”81 and do not require the same procedural safeguards as criminal pro-
ceedings. The courts also have drawn distinctions between the process that 
is due to aliens excludable prior to admission into the U.S. and the process 
due to aliens subject to deportation after entry.82 Because the regulation of 
aliens is related to issues of national security and foreign relations, U.S. 
courts have shown deference to the judgment of Congress and the President 
in these matters.83
79 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
80 See U.S. CONST. amend V; but see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (defining “citizen-
ship”). Aliens are not afforded the rights that are limited to citizens such as those in the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clauses. Cf. id. (explicitly prohibiting abridging the rights of citizens 
only). 
81 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).  
82 See, e.g., id. at 678, 679, 719–21 (distinguishing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), and concluding that “[t]he distinction between an alien who has 
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout im-
migration law” and “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the 
Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, wheth-
er their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent”). The question of wheth-
er the Due Process Clause provides protection to aliens held outside the U.S. but on territory 
over which the U.S. exercises exclusive authority and control was recently before the Su-
preme Court. See Brief for Petitioner at i, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2007) (No. 
06-1195).  Although the Court did not explicitly hold that the protections of the Due Process 
Clause apply to aliens held in such circumstances, it did hold that the protections of the Sus-
pension Clause apply, and that the limited process established by the Detainee Treatment Act 
to review Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) determinations was a constitutionally 
inadequate substitute for the habeas review to which the petitioners were entitled. See Bou-
mediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2244–2262 (2008). See infra note 110 for a discussion of 
CSRTs.
83 See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure autho-
rized by Congress is, it is due process as far as alien denied entry is concerned”); Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §§ 721 and 722 (and com-
ments and notes thereto) (the U.S. may deport permanent resident aliens even if the person 
peacefully resided in the U.S. for many years if sufficient procedural safeguards are fol-
lowed; such aliens can be deported even for activities that Congress could not define and 
punish as a crime, such as political activities otherwise protected by the first amendment). 
The Court also has broadly continued to affirm the broad powers of the political branches 
with regard to immigration controls, including upholding the more controversial ideological 
provisions found in the national security grounds for removal, and even in cases involving 
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Still, when it comes to preventive detention of removable (that is, 
excludable or deportable) aliens, the Supreme Court has taken a more rigor-
ous approach in recent years in recognition of due process concerns. Under 
U.S. immigration law, aliens ordered removed from the U.S. are detained 
for up to 90-days during a statutory “removal period” after the removal or-
der has been issued.84 The immigration law also authorizes further detention 
of certain removable aliens whose removal is not accomplished during the 
removal period.85 Prior to 2001, the U.S. immigration authorities maintained 
a practice pursuant to this statute of indefinitely detaining these categories 
of removable aliens if not removed during the statutory 90-day “removal 
period.”86    
In June 2001, the Court limited this practice in Zadvydas v. Davis, a 
case involving two resident aliens ordered removed due to convictions for 
aggravated crimes.87 To avoid a constitutional due process problem, the 
Court read the statute to “limit[] an alien’s post-removal-period detention to 
a period reasonably necessary to bring about that that alien’s removal from 
the United States. [The statute] does not permit indefinite detention.”88 The 
Court also imposed a 180-day period during which post-removal detention 
is presumptively valid, but after which the government generally must show 
evidence of a significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future in 
order to continue the detention.89
The Court compelled these requirements even though eventual re-
moval of the alien remained possible, good faith efforts at removal contin-
ued, and the detention underwent periodic administrative review.90 The 
Court held that these considerations were outweighed by the fact that “the 
civil confinement at issue is not limited, but potentially permanent,”91 and 
longtime lawful resident aliens.  See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
84 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2006). 
85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(2006); see also DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OIG-07-28, ICE’S COMPLIANCE WITH DETENTION 
LIMITS FOR ALIENS WITH A FINAL ORDER OF REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (Feb. 
2007) [hereinafter DHS OIG Report]. The provision of the statute allowing for extended 
post-removal period detention applies to aliens who are: (1) inadmissible; (2) removable as a 
result of violations of entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of national 
security or foreign policy; or (3) represent a threat to the community or a flight risk if re-
leased. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
86 See DHS OIG Report, supra note 85, at 3. 
87 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
88 Id. at 689. 
89 See id. at 701. In some cases, the government is not required to release an alien who was 
not removed after 180 days. Id.
90 See id. at 685, 696.
91 Id. at 691. 
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“[t]he provision authorizing detention does not apply narrowly to ‘a small 
segment of particularly dangerous individuals,’ say suspected terrorists, but 
broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including 
tourist visa violations.”92 Further, “the sole procedural protections available 
to the alien are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien bears 
the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without . . . significant later judi-
cial review. . . .  [T]he Constitution may well preclude granting an adminis-
trative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating 
fundamental rights.”93 Once again considerations about whether the deten-
tion power was narrowly tailored to a specially dangerous class of persons, 
and subject to adequate procedural safeguards, guided the Court’s decision.  
Yet, despite these due process concerns, the Court indicated that the restric-
tions imposed would not necessarily apply in a case that involves a sus-
pected terrorist alien or a case that raises other national security concerns. 
Indeed, the Zadvydas Court stressed that it was not considering “ter-
rorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be 
made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the 
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national secu-
rity.”94 And when the Court extended the Zadvydas rule to inadmissible 
aliens in Clark v. Martinez, it took pains to point out that “sustained deten-
tion of alien terrorists is a ‘special arrangement’ authorized by a different 
statutory provision.”95 Moreover, the Court held that the capacity of Con-
gress to “secur[e] our borders” against non-removable aliens  
is demonstrated by [the fact that] [l]ess than four months after the release 
of our opinion [in Zadvydas], Congress enacted a statute which expressly 
authorized continued detention, for a period of six months beyond the re-
moval period (and renewable indefinitely), of any alien (1) whose removal 
is not reasonably foreseeable and (2) who presents a national security 
threat or has been involved in terrorist activities.96
The U.S. government also adopted this approach in immigration 
regulations issued after the Zadvydas case. The regulations established three 
categories of aliens who may be detained beyond the presumptive 180-day 
92 Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997) (emphasis added)). 
93 Id. at 692 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 452 U.S. 466 
(2004) (holding that U.S. district courts can hear habeas corpus petitions from aliens cap-
tured on a battlefield and detained at a location over which the U.S. exercises plenary juris-
diction, albeit on statutory rather than constitutional grounds). 
94 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Attorney General’s 
authority to detain aliens, noted that “if Congress had meant to authorize long-term detention 
of unremovable aliens, it certainly could have spoken in clearer terms.” Id. at 697. 
95 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379, n.4 (2005). 
96 Id. at 386, n.8 (citing USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6)(2001)). 
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period even if not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, 
including aliens: (1) who have highly contagious diseases; (2) whose release 
may cause serious adverse foreign policy consequences; and (3) who are 
being detained for national security or terrorism concerns.97
4. Enemy combatants 
Enemy combatants also are subject to preventive detention absent 
conviction in a criminal proceeding.98 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld the preventive detention of enemy combatants under the customary 
law of armed conflict, which helps to explain the robust efforts of the U.S. 
government to apply this legal paradigm to the problem of international 
terrorism in the wake of 9/11. The application of this customary power to 
certain international terrorist suspects (U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike) 
was squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.99 The 
Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) provided “explicit congressional authorization for the deten-
tion” of “individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as 
part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda 
terrorist network responsible for those attacks,”100 and that “the AUMF sa-
tisfied [the Non-Detention Act’s] requirement that a detention be ‘pursuant 
to an Act of Congress’ (assuming, without deciding, that [the Non-
Detention Act] applies to military detentions).”101 According to the Court, 
“[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, deten-
tion, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and practice, 
are important incidents of war. The purpose of detention is to prevent cap-
97 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a)–(d) (2001); DHS OIG REPORT, supra note 85, at 4–5. Certification 
that an alien meets one or more of these criteria requires substantial factual support and ap-
proval by senior government officials. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14. The statute also allows for 
detention of aliens determined to be “specially dangerous” beyond the 180-day presumptive 
period; however, during 2008 two Federal courts held that this provision of the statute was 
unconstitutional. See Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Carrera v. 
Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Kan. 2008).
98 During times of war Congress may also authorize the detention of “alien enemies,” 
meaning “[s]ubjects of a foreign state at war with the United States.” Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. 763, 769, n.2 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Techt v. Hughes, 
128 N.E. 185, 186 (1920)); see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving 
executive power to detain enemy aliens in times of war). 
99 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
100 Id. at 518. Congress adopted the AUMF in September 2001. Id. The AUMF empowered 
the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or 
persons” that he determines “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks. Id. (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).  
101 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. 
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tured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms 
once again.”102 Moreover, “there is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its 
own citizens as an enemy combatant . . . . A citizen, no less than an alien, 
can be ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition 
partners’ and ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States”; 
“such a citizen, if released, would pose the same threat of returning to the 
front during the ongoing conflict.”103
But just as we have seen under the other categories of preventive 
detention, the Court limited this power in three important substantive or 
procedural regards. First, the Court acknowledged Hamdi’s concern for the 
“substantial prospect of indefinite detention” given that “the national securi-
ty underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, [were] 
broad and malleable” and reflective of the unconventional nature of the con-
flict at issue.104 Much like in the Salerno case, the Court resolved this issue 
by differentiating between indefinite detention and detention with an uncer-
tain end. Hamdi’s detention could only last as long as “the record establish-
es that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanis-
tan.”105 While this period had no fixed end date, the period’s end date could 
be determined with relative certainty, and thus was not an “indefinite” pe-
riod in the Court’s view. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that it affirmed 
the detention power “based on long-standing law of war principles” and 
“[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict [were] entirely unlike 
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding [would] unravel.”106 Second, the Court specifically stated that 
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”107
Third, the Court concluded that a citizen such as Hamdi, who disputed the 
enemy combatant designation underlying his detention, was entitled to no-
tice of the factual basis for his detention and a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge his detention before a neutral decision maker.108 While recogniz-
ing these procedural safeguards, the Court acknowledged that under some 
circumstances such proceedings could be tailored to the situation; eviden-
tiary rules, burdens of proof and other aspects of such a hearing might be 
102 Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Note that the Hamdi case 
involved a U.S. citizen captured on foreign soil.  The same power of detention, however, 
applies to foreign nationals who satisfy the Court’s descriptive category. 
103 Id. at 519. 
104 Id. at 520. 
105 Id. at 521. 
106 Id. (noting that Afghanistan was similar to conflicts that contributed to the development 
of the law of war because “[a]ctive combat operations” continued in Afghanistan).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 533. 
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significantly altered from those applicable in criminal proceedings.109 The 
Court noted, however, that Hamdi’s right to an attorney in such proceedings 
was “unquestionabl[e].”110
In Padilla v. Hanft, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit closely followed the Hamdi decision, permitting enemy 
combatant detention of a U.S. citizen who took up arms against the United 
States in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban.111 Padilla left the battlefield 
in Afghanistan for the alleged purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks on 
U.S. soil, and was initially arrested by civilian law enforcement authorities 
upon his arrival in the U.S.112 However, as discussed above, the Fourth Cir-
cuit later initially refused to extend this power to sanction enemy combatant 
detention of the resident alien in the al-Marri case, reasoning that Hamdi
and Padilla stand for the proposition that “who fits within the ‘legal catego-
ry’ of enemy combatant . . .  rest[s] . . .  on affiliation with the military arm 
of an enemy nation.”113 According to the court, al-Marri did not qualify for 
the enemy combatant “exception to the usual criminal process” because, 
unlike Hamdi and Padilla, al-Marri was not alleged to have taken up arms 
against the U.S. in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban or “to have engaged 
in combat with United States forces anywhere in the world.”114 Indeed, the 
court explicitly rejected the government’s argument that “al-Marri’s seizure 
and indefinite military detention . . . are justified because he engaged in, and 
continues to pose a very real threat of carrying out, . . . acts of international 
109 Id. at 533–34. 
110 Id. at 539.  The U.S. government responded to the Hamdi decision and to the decision of 
the Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), by instituting Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CSRTs) for enemy combatants held in the war on terror. COMBATANT STATUS 
REVIEW TRIBUNALS, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20 
%Fact%Sheet.pdf. Among other things, the CSRTs provide for the right to: (1) review the 
unclassified basis for the detainees detention; (2) have hearing in front of a tribunal of  neu-
tral military officers; (3) testify or introduce documentary evidence; (4) call (if reasonably 
available) and question witnesses before the tribunal; (5) attend all proceedings except when 
matters that would compromise national security are involved; (6)  receive assistance of an 
appointed personal representative; and (7) submit the tribunal decision to automatic review 
by a higher authority. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gordon England, U.S. Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, to Secretary of the Military Departments Joint Chief of Staff Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for 
Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006),  
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
111 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
112 Id.
113 Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2007).
114 Id. at 183. 
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terrorism” on behalf of al Qaeda.115 Thus, the Fourth Circuit panel would 
not extend the “special justification” of enemy combatant status to a person 
alleged only to be an operative of a non-state international terrorist organi-
zation such as al Qaeda.116
In sum, preventive detention in the U.S. generally requires not just a 
finding of dangerousness, but a finding of dangerousness combined with: 
(1) adequate procedural safeguards; and (2) some “special justification” 
such as mental illness, incompetence, abnormality, lack of control, commu-
nicable disease, or special status as an alien or enemy.117 Potentially indefi-
nite detention is particularly suspicious.  
In light of these cases, the question becomes whether ties to terror-
ism suffice as an appropriate “special justification” and, if so, what proce-
dural safeguards should apply?  
C. Does Terrorism Pose the “Special Danger” Required by the U.S. 
Supreme Court? 
In the Zadvydas and Clark cases, the Supreme Court suggested that 
terrorism indeed may justify an exception to the general rule against indefi-
nite preventive detention, particularly where aliens are involved. On the 
other hand, the Fourth Circuit panel in the al-Marri case explicitly held that 
115 Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 183–84 (internal quotation and alteration omitted) (“[T]he gov-
ernment is mistaken in its representation that Hamdi and Padilla recognized [t]he President’s 
authority to detain ‘enemy combatants’ during the current conflict with al Qaeda. No 
precedent recognizes any such authority.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
116 Again, the original al-Marri decision, which was issued by a split panel, was vacated 
and reheard en banc.  Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). Unlike the origi-
nal panel, the en banc court held that al-Marri could be held as an enemy combatant, assum-
ing the government’s allegations about his conduct were true.  Id. at 216–17. In fact, Judge 
Traxler, the sole member of the court concurring in all aspects of the en banc judgment, 
vehemently disagreed with the original panel’s premise that “because al Qaeda is not techni-
cally in control of an enemy nation or its government, it cannot be considered as anything 
other than a criminal organization whose members are entitled to all the protections and 
procedures granted by our constitution. . . . [A]l Qaeda is much more and much worse than a 
criminal organization.  And while it may be an unconventional enemy force in a historical 
context, it is an enemy force nonetheless.” Id. at 160 (Traxler, J., concurring). The al-Marri
case is subject to further proceedings on remand, see supra note 41, and the tension about the 
proper application of LOAC doctrines to a conflict as unconventional as the global campaign 
against international terrorism is not likely to go away soon. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recently agreed to review the al-Marri case during the 2008 term. See Robert Barnes, 
Justices to Decide Legality of Indefinite Detention, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at A2.  
117 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (“[W]e have upheld preventive 
detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and 
subject to strong procedural protections . . . . In cases in which preventive detention is of 
potentially indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be 
accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create 
the danger.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
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alleged involvement with international terrorism is insufficient to warrant 
extension of the enemy combatant exception, even to an alien, and a similar 
argument was raised by the petitioners in Boumediene v. Bush.118 Can ter-
rorism qualify as a sufficient special danger justifying preventive detention?
Concerns about both security and liberty strongly suggest the an-
swer is “Yes.” As recounted earlier, international terrorism poses significant 
investigative and prosecutorial challenges that the ordinary criminal justice 
system is not equipped to handle. And, as former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo 
White has indicated, the ordinary criminal justice system is not capable of 
deterring large numbers of committed extremists who are “willing, indeed 
anxious, to die in service of their cause.”119 Furthermore, the nature and 
magnitude of the injury that modern international terrorist organizations 
seek to inflict is categorically different from the harms that the ordinary 
criminal justice system was designed to remedy. It seems clear that (the 
Fourth Circuit’s initial al-Marri panel notwithstanding) individual opera-
tives of sub-state terrorist organizations can pose the kind of special danger 
the Supreme Court has identified. For example, suppose that the U.S. gov-
ernment—using sensitive, credible, but ultimately inadmissible intelligence 
information—succeeded in disrupting an al Qaeda plot to simultaneously fly 
multiple airliners into iconic buildings in various U.S. cities, and the opera-
tives involved were U.S. citizens and/or aliens who never fought against the 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan or elsewhere.  
118 The Boumediene petitioners argued, among other things, that their detention as enemy 
combatants was illegal. They contended that aliens allegedly connected to al Qaeda, but 
arrested by civilian police in a friendly country and not alleged to have participated directly 
in armed combat against the U.S., do not satisfy the enemy combatant exception pursuant to 
the AUMF and Hamdi. Further, they argued that the CSRT process established in the wake 
of Hamdi did not provide meaningful notice of the basis of detention, an opportunity to be 
heard, representation by counsel, or a neutral decision maker, which they claimed are re-
quired by Fifth Amendment due process. The government strongly disagreed, arguing that 
petitioners were aliens detained outside the U.S. and as such were not entitled to constitu-
tional due process guarantees, and that in any event the CSRT process provided even more 
due process than Hamdi required for U.S. citizens held as enemy combatants or than is pro-
vided under the process in place to comply with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. See Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, Boumediene 
v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195). In its decision, the Court declined to address 
whether the President had authority to detain the petitioners. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 
2229, 2240 (2008).  Moreover, the Court rendered no judgment as to whether the CSRTs 
satisfy due process standards.  Id. at 2270. The Court did hold, however, that the petitioners 
were entitled to constitutional habeas review and to protection of the Suspension Clause, and 
that the limited process established by the Detainee Treatment Act to review CSRT determi-
nations was a constitutionally inadequate substitute for such habeas review. Id. at 2244–
2262.
119 Mary Jo White, Prosecuting Terrorism in the Criminal Justice System, XV(1) ARMS 
CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND INT’L SECURITY 3, 8 (2003).
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The al-Marri case seems to direct that, absent criminal prosecution, 
those involved must be released or, if aliens, deported. Preventive detention 
would be impossible. This outcome seems inappropriate and unnecessary.120
Moreover, the liberty concerns underlying al-Marri and other cases also 
favor a preventive detention system (with strong substantive and procedural 
safeguards built in) to handle terrorism cases that do not easily fit within the 
traditional categories of detention, lest the pressures on the traditional law 
enforcement and enemy combatant models permanently warp the principles 
that underlie them. 
II. A “SECURITY DETENTION ACT” FOR THE U.S.?
If terrorism does represent the special danger that justifies preven-
tive detention, then one must ask what such a security detention system for 
terrorist suspects would look like? The foregoing analysis of U.S. and inter-
national law, and a review of several preventive detention programs pro-
posed or adopted by other countries,121 identifies eight fundamental issues 
that must be addressed in any legislation of this type. 
A. Nature of the System 
Legislation must address the nature of the system. To this point, this 
article has discussed exclusively actual physical detention of terrorist sus-
pects. Israel’s Administrative Detention Act employs this approach. How-
ever, several systems adopted in recent years provide control options that 
represent a less drastic intrusion of the liberty interest at stake. For example, 
both the United Kingdom and Australia have enacted legislation permitting 
authorities to impose “control orders” on terrorist suspects without subject-
120 As Justice John Paul Stevens acknowledged when the Padilla case initially reached the 
Supreme Court in 2004, “[e]xecutive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of ene-
my soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons 
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
121 The preventive detention schemes reviewed for this article include the system of dero-
gating and non-derogating control orders established by the United Kingdom’s Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); the system of control orders and preventive detention orders 
established by Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2), 2005, c. 144 (Austl.); Israel’s Emer-
gency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-99), reprinted in Emanual Gross, 
Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a 
Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 721 (2001); and the system of investigative hearings and recognizance orders con-
templated by Canada’s Bill S-3, see LAURA BARNETT, AN ACT TO AMEND THE CRIMINAL
CODE, (INVESTIGATIVE HEARING AND RECOGNIZANCE WITH CONDITIONS), LS-574E, at 3–6 
 (2008), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=3
334060&file=4, as adopted by the Canadian Senate on March 6, 2008 and on first reading in 
the Canadian House of Commons. 
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ing them to arrest or detention.122 The Parliament of Canada is presently 
considering123 a system of “recognizance” orders that are very similar.  
Control order schemes allow imposition of a broad range of restric-
tions and prohibitions,124 and generally provide an option that is subject to 
fewer procedural safeguards than actual physical detention. However, the 
British, Australian, and Canadian control order systems also authorize more 
drastic measures under certain circumstances. Under the U.K. legislation, 
the government may at times seek a control order that derogates from the 
U.K.’s arrest and detention obligations under Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.125 Similarly, the Australian and the Canadian 
122 The United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act permitted the U.K. to 
deport aliens who were suspected international terrorists, or to detain such aliens indefinitely 
where deportation could not be accomplished. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, 
c. 24 §§ 22–23 (Eng.). If either an international legal obligation or a practical consideration 
(for example, human rights concerns in the receiving country, documentation issues, etc.) 
prevented removal pursuant to such an order, the U.K. authorities were authorized to detain 
the suspected terrorist indefinitely. Id. In December 2004, the U.K. House of Lords invali-
dated the alien detention provisions of the ATCSA. A v. Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 56.  
The Lords ruled that the detention provisions, in particular the indefinite detention provi-
sions, violated the European Convention on Human Rights in that their effect on foreign 
nationals was a disproportionate, irrational, and discriminatory deprivation of liberty com-
pared to the threat posed by foreign nationals. Id. In response to the House of Lords judg-
ment, the British Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA), which 
explicitly repealed the detention provisions of the ATCSA and instituted the current system 
of derogating and non-derogating control orders. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 
(Eng.).
123 The Canadian legislation is largely identical to the system enacted by Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, which expired after five years and was not immediately re-
authorized. Compare Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., c. 41 (Can.), with BARNETT, supra note 
121.
124 Examples include restrictions on movement, premises, communications, associations, 
activities, use or possession of articles or substances, and the wearing of electronic tracking 
devices. See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (Eng.).   
125 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 1 (Eng.). Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights stipulates that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the follow-
ing cases,” which include: (1) detention upon criminal conviction; (2) detention for non-
compliance with a lawful court order; (3) criminal pre-trial detention; (4) detention of a 
minor for educational supervision; (5) detention of the mentally ill, controlled substance 
abusers, and those with infectious diseases; and (6) detention with a view toward deportation 
or extradition. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
Amended by Protocol No. 11 art. 5(1), Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  A control order that 
impinges these rights is called a “derogating” order under the U.K. system, and must be 
imposed by a court. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.).  An order that impos-
es restrictions but that does not violate the person’s rights relating to physical arrest and 
detention is called a “non-derogating” order, and may be imposed by the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department. Id. § 2. However, it seems at least one U.K. court has held that 
certain orders imposed by the government, though styled as non-derogating orders, impose 
restrictions that in fact amount to deprivation of liberty prohibited by the arrest and detention 
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legislation each permit physical detention in exigent circumstances.126 Con-
trol order systems also provide that failure to observe the conditions im-
posed by the order, or obstruction of those exercising the control order pow-
ers, may be grounds for arrest, detention, and potential imprisonment.127   
The dual approach of control order systems is appealing in light of 
the U.S. case law outlined above. The ability to impose lesser intrusions on 
all but the most dangerous suspects works to limit the class of potential de-
tainees in the manner required by the Supreme Court. Moreover, less intru-
sive restrictions generally require less burdensome procedural guarantees.
B. Definitional Threshold 
Any new security detention system should not broadly authorize de-
tention for anyone who poses a threat to national security. Rather, preven-
tive detention should be available only for those individuals who represent 
the central threat of modern terrorism and who cannot be handled without 
straining ordinary criminal justice processes or law of armed conflict doc-
trines. One of the principal concerns with the U.S.’s current multi-prong 
approach to the detention of terror suspects is that it has ensnared individu-
als and conduct that are increasingly remote from the primary terrorist ac-
tors and activities. Similarly, the Supreme Court has expressed concern with 
preventive detention schemes that define the pool of potential detainees too 
broadly.128 If suspected involvement with international terrorism is to justify 
preventive detention outside one of the existing categories, the definitional 
threshold must be strict.  
A comparison of other systems is instructive. Israel, for example, 
permits administrative detention of anyone when reasonable cause exists to 
believe that reasons of State security or public security require detention.129
While this is an exceptionally broad threshold, it is subject to some limita-
tions. For example, administrative detention can only occur during a state of 
emergency (which has existed continuously in Israel since 1948), and may 
be imposed only if it is the sole means available to detain the person,130
meaning that criminal prosecution must not be a practical option. 
provisions of Article 5, not merely a restriction of liberty. See JJ and Others v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWHC 1623.  
126 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.4, sched. 4 (Austl.); Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 
S.C., c. 41, § 4 (Can.). 
127 E.g., Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 104.27, sched. 4 (Austl.); Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 2 § 9 (Eng.).
128 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 51–52, 58-63, 66–74, 87–93. 
129 Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in 
Gross, supra note 121, at 725. 
130 Id.
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The threshold for imposition of a control order in Britain depends 
on the nature of the order and reflects the different restrictions of liberty at 
stake. Derogating orders may be confirmed by the court only if: (1) it is 
more probable than not that the person is or has been “involved in terrorism-
related activity”; (2) the obligations imposed are necessary to protect mem-
bers of the public from a risk of terrorism; (3) the risk at issue is associated 
with a public emergency for which the government has issued a formal no-
tice of derogation from all or part of Article 5 of the ECHR; and (4) the 
obligations imposed by the order are among those listed in the government’s 
derogation notice.131 Non-derogating control orders, however, have a lesser 
threshold. The Secretary of State may issue a non-derogating control order 
if he: (1) has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is or has been 
“involved in terrorism-related activity”; and (2) considers the imposition of 
the order and the obligations it imposes necessary to protect the public from 
a risk of terrorism.132 But, much like Israel, where the “involvement with 
terrorist-related activity” that gives rise to a control order suggests the 
commission of a criminal offense, the Secretary of State must consult with 
police and prosecution officials before making or applying for the order to 
determine if evidence exists that could realistically be used to prosecute the 
subject of the order for an offense related to terrorism.133 If the order is is-
sued, the police officials must continue to investigate to determine if prose-
cution becomes possible during the duration of the order.134
The Australian system seems to have the highest threshold to obtain 
a control order. A federal police officer may apply for a preventive deten-
tion order with respect to a person for either of two reasons: (1) if he rea-
sonably suspects that the person “will engage in a terrorist act, possesses a 
thing connected with the preparation for, or engagement … in, a terrorist 
131 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.). 
132 Id. The terms “involvement in terrorism-related activity” and “terrorism” are defined 
very broadly. “Involvement in terrorism-related activity” means: (a) the commission, prepa-
ration or instigation of terrorism; (b) facilitating, encouraging, or intending to facilitate or 
encourage the same; or (c) giving support or assistance to those known or believed to be 
involved in terrorism-related activity.  It does not matter if the foregoing conduct relates to a 
specific act of terrorism, or to terrorism in general. See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 
c.2, § 1.9 (Eng.).  “Terrorism” has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000, which 
defines the term as the use or threat of action that (a) involves serious violence against a 
person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person’s life, creates a serious risk 
to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to 
interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system; (b) is designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and (c) is made for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 
1(Eng.).
133 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 8 (Eng.). 
134 See id. 
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act,” or has taken an action in preparation for a terrorist act; or (2) if a ter-
rorist act has occurred within the past 28 days and detention of the person 
for the period imposed is reasonably necessary to preserve evidence relating 
to the act.135 A future terrorist act must be imminent, meaning at the most it 
is expected to occur within the following 14 days.136     
C. Duration of Detention 
Any new legislation on preventive detention must address the dura-
tion of detention. As discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
decided bias against indefinite detention, particularly absent the existence of 
some special factor that both narrowly limits the class of people to which 
the detention potentially applies and confirms the heightened danger that 
class poses, as well as the existence of strict procedural safeguards. Thus, 
potentially lengthy detention periods require a stricter definitional threshold 
and more robust procedural safeguards. 
The foreign detention schemes reviewed for this article vary broad-
ly in potential duration. For example, preventive detention orders in Aus-
tralia may not exceed 48 hours and are subject to restrictions on the imposi-
tion of multiple detention orders.137 In contrast, detention orders under 
Israel’s Administrative Detention Act may be imposed for up to six months 
and are renewable indefinitely for successive six-month periods.138 In Brit-
ain, duration depends on the nature of the control order, again reflecting the 
degree of infringement of the person’s liberty. Non-derogating control or-
ders in Britain last for up to 12 months and are renewable for successive 12-
month periods, while derogating control orders may be issued for six-month 
periods, subject to renewal by the court.139 Further, the legislation provides 
that persons may be arrested and detained for up to 96 hours during the 
pendency of an application for a derogating control order.140
D. Appropriate Decision-maker 
Preventative detention legislation must authorize an official to im-
pose the detention. Most foreign preventive detention systems involve an 
initial determination made by order of a competent and independent judicial 
135 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.4, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
136 Id.
137 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.1, sched. 4 (Austl.). (“[T]he object of this [Act] 
is to allow a person to be taken into custody and detained for a short period of time . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
138 Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-99), reprinted in 
Gross, supra note 121, at 725. 
139 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, §§ 2, 4 (Eng.). 
140 See Id. § 5. 
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official upon application of an executive official at a sufficiently high level 
to provide subsequent accountability. In urgent circumstances, however, 
provisions are usually made for an initial detention decision by an appro-
priately high-ranking executive official, with subsequent confirmation by a 
judicial authority.141
E. Nature of Process, Including Standard of Proof, Evidentiary Rules, 
and Detainee Rights 
A security detention system also should specify any detainee rights 
and the procedural safeguards associated with the protection and exercise of 
detainee rights. As outlined earlier, notice of the basis for detention and the 
ability to seek independent review are basic standards.142  Other important 
issues include a detainee’s right to counsel, standards and burdens of proof, 
evidentiary rules on admissibility and reliability, rules for the use and pro-
tection of classified information, rules regarding the interrogation of detai-
nees, presence of counsel during interrogation, and the permitted uses of 
information obtained from such interrogation. Israel, Australia, and the U.K. 
each provide different procedural safeguards and assurances of a detainee’s 
rights. 
In Israel, an administrative detainee must be brought before a dis-
trict court judge within 48 hours or be released.143 While the detainee has 
the right to know the basis for his detention, to have access to counsel, and 
to be present and have counsel present at the judicial confirmation hearing, 
the detention court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, if such evidence 
is deemed reliable, even if that evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible in 
criminal proceedings.144 The court also may order sensitive evidence with-
141 For example, in Israel’s administrative detention may occur upon an order issued by the 
Minister of Defense, subject to judicial confirmation. See Israel’s Emergency Powers (Deten-
tion) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in Gross, supra note 121, at 725. In Aus-
tralia, a federal police officer may apply to a senior police official for a preventive detention 
order lasting up to 24 hours. Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.8, sched. 4 (Austl.).  A 
judge or federal magistrate may extend a preventive detention order for up to a total of 48 
hours. Id. § 105.12.  In Britain, under normal circumstances, the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department may apply to a court for imposition of a non-derogating control order. 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 2 (Eng.). The Secretary of State may issue a non-
derogating control order in urgent circumstances, subject to subsequent confirmation by the 
court. Id. Control orders that derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR may only be issued, re-
gardless of circumstances, by a court. Id. § 1(2). 
142 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 48–52, 58–63, 66–74, 87–93, 104–09.  
143 Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in 
Gross, supra note 121, at 756. 
144 Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in 
Gross, supra note 121, at 773.  
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held from a detainee if disclosure would threaten national security.145
Commentators suggest that the applicable evidentiary standard is generally 
accepted to be a “clear and convincing” standard and that more evidence is 
thought to be required as a practical matter the longer detention continues (a 
proportionality rule of sorts).146
Australian detainees and their lawyers must be given a copy of the 
detention order and a summary of the grounds for detention.147 Detainees 
have the right to contact lawyers, family members, and employers for li-
mited purposes, and to contact the police Ombudsman.148 However, the 
government may seek an order restricting the person’s ability to contact 
virtually any person, including particular family members and particular 
attorneys, and the content of a detainee’s communications may be moni-
tored.149 The Australian Act specifically requires that a person detained un-
der the Act must be treated humanely and may not be subjected to any cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.150 The government may not question a 
detainee during detention, for law enforcement or intelligence purposes,151
145 Id.  
146 See id. at 773–74.  
147 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.32, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
148 Id. §§ 105.35–105.37. 
149 Id. §§ 105.34–38.The content of such communications with a lawyer may not, however, 
be admitted in any criminal proceedings. Id. Family members, lawyers and others may be 
subject to up to five years imprisonment for improperly disclosing information pertaining to 
a detention order. Id. § 105.41. 
150 Id. § 105.33. 
151 Considering that the justification for preventive detention is the potential dangerousness 
of the detainee and not his intelligence value, some systems impose strict limits on intelli-
gence interrogations of detainees. See, e.g., id. a § 105.42.  But the issue of interrogation of 
detainees, particularly for intelligence purposes, is important and must be resolved. Many of 
the procedural and substantive rights associated with preventive detention programs may 
prove problematic for intelligence gathering, which is a critical element of the new preven-
tion imperative. For example, most experienced interrogators maintain that isolation can be 
among the most useful interrogation techniques, and interruption of the interrogation process 
(for example, to meet with legal counsel) can negatively impact information gathering. See,
e.g., Paul Rosenzweig & James Jay Carafano, Preventive Detention and Actionable Intelli-
gence, 13 LEGAL MEMORANDUM 1 (The Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 16, 2004, 
at 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm13.cfm. Professors 
Goldsmith and Katyal have suggested a system of delayed access to counsel to permit limited 
interrogation as a possible solution. Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terror-
ists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19. One potential solution might involve a 
process modeled on that used in Spain, where terrorism suspects may be held in police cus-
tody for up to five days before a decision to commence criminal proceedings is made. Maria 
Alvanou, Terrorism Legislation Issues in Spain: Terrorism Offenses and ‘Incommunicado’ 
Procedures, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES, 2007,
http:/rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=405&Itemid=41. The person 
may be held incommunicado during that period pursuant to court authorization. Id. Moreo-
ver, the incommunicado period may be extended for an additional eight days if the decision 
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except to confirm identity and safety, and any questioning must be video-
taped.
Once again, the rights and procedures applicable under Britain’s 
control order system vary with the nature of the order. The subject of any 
control order must be informed of the imposition of a control order.152  For 
non-derogating control orders, the court may conduct an ex parte hearing of 
the government’s basis for issuing the order.153 If convinced that the gov-
ernment’s decision is not “obviously flawed,” the court must conduct a full 
hearing to determine the appropriateness of the order and the obligations 
imposed.154 At the full hearing, the court must determine whether the gov-
ernment’s decision was flawed in respect of any of the following issues: (1) 
the existence of reasonable grounds to suspect that the person was “involved 
in terrorism-related activity”; (2) that a control order was necessary to pro-
tect members of the public from the risk of terrorism; or (3) the necessity of 
the particular obligations imposed.155  The court may order the government 
to revoke or modify the order as appropriate.  Non-derogating control orders 
issued by the government in exigent circumstances must be referred to the 
court immediately, and the court must commence consideration of the order 
no more than seven days after the order took effect.156  In the case of dero-
gating control orders, upon application by the British government, the court 
will hold an immediate preliminary hearing (which, again, may be ex parte)
to determine if a prima facie case exists for the imposition of an order.157 If 
such a case exists, the court will impose the order subject to a subsequent 
full hearing.158 At that hearing, the court will confirm the control order only 
if it is convinced that the threshold standard has been met and if it has not 
been met, the court may quash or modify the obligations originally im-
posed.159   
is made to commence criminal proceedings. Id. During an incommunicado period, a sus-
pect’s relatives may not be informed of the detention and legal services are provided by a 
duty solicitor, not an attorney chosen by the suspect. Id.  A suspect held incommunicado may 
be questioned in the presence of the duty solicitor, who may advise the suspect on matters of 
procedure but may not consult privately with the suspect. Id. Note, however, that a forensic 
physician is assigned to examine the suspect during the period and ensure the suspect is not 
abused, and must make a report to the supervising judicial authority. Id.  The suspect may 
not see a lawyer of his choosing or notify anyone of his detention until the end of the in-
communicado period, which may last a total of thirteen days. Id.
152 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 7 (Eng.). 
153 Id. § 3. 
154 Id. § 4. 
155 See id.
156 Id. § 3. 
157 See id. § 4. 
158 Id. 
159 Id.
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The British system also addresses a number of evidentiary and re-
lated procedural concerns. For example, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
imposes an obligation on the government to disclose all evidence relevant to 
the control order proceedings.160 However, the Act directs the courts to es-
tablish rules allowing the government to withhold sensitive information 
from anyone other than the court or certain qualified lawyers designated as 
“special advocates,” and to exclude the controlled person and his legal 
counsel from proceedings when considering such evidence.161 In those cir-
cumstances, the special advocates shall represent the interests of the con-
trolled person, but shall not be responsible to him or his legal counsel. 162
The British Act does not, however, address the extent to which those subject 
to control orders may be interrogated, or any restrictions on potential uses of 
the information that may be obtained from interrogation. 
U.S. law provides a relevant example of how these issues have been 
handled in a non-criminal context involving terrorism and preventive deten-
tion. In 1996, as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), the U.S. created a new removal process for aliens called the 
Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC), which is comprised of five federal 
district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.163
ATRC proceedings are available to the government in any case where, on 
application by the Attorney General, the Court finds probable cause to be-
lieve that: (1) the alien is a terrorist; (2) the alien is present in the U.S.; and 
(3) ordinary removal proceedings would pose a risk to national security due 
to disclosure of classified information.164
More specifically, the ATRC legislation allows the government to 
use classified information to establish grounds for removal without disclo-
sure to the alien if a risk to national security would result.  In place of the 
160 Id. § 4, sched. Control order proceedings, etc. 
161 Id. §§ 4, 7. When the court opts to withhold evidence, the courts may also provide for 
summaries of the sensitive evidence. Id. § 4. 
162 Id. § 7. 
163 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2000). Recall that removable aliens are detainable pending the re-
moval determination and pending actual removal, particularly in cases involving terrorism. 
See supra text accompanying notes 76–83. Note also that the Alien Terrorist Removal Court 
provisions rarely, if ever, have been used since their adoption in 1996, primarily because the 
provisions’ intricate procedures are considered unworkable, but also in part because of due 
process concerns. Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal 
Court, 17(12) WASH. LEGAL FOUNDATION 1, 2 (2002). One other potential example of how 
current U.S. law and practice address these issues  is the CSRT. COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNALS, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20%Fact% 
Sheet.pdf. However, as previously mentioned, the CSRT system continues to face significant 
constitutional challenge. The Boumediene case recently decided by the Supreme Court is just 
one example. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
164 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1996). 
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classified information, unclassified summaries approved by the court can be 
provided to the alien and his attorney. Where unclassified summaries are 
not possible, and the alien is a legal permanent resident, special pre-cleared 
attorneys who can review the classified material are available.165 The re-
moval hearing may continue without disclosure or summaries if the court 
determines that serious and irreparable harm to national security might oth-
erwise result. 
The AEDPA also spells out the rights of the aliens in ATRC pro-
ceedings, including (1) notice of the nature of charges; (2) a public hearing 
and the right to be present at the hearing (except when considering sensitive 
information); (3) a compensated right to counsel; and (4) a reasonable op-
portunity to call and confront witnesses and to offer evidence.166 The gov-
ernment bears the burden of proof in ATRC proceedings under a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, but the ordinary rules of evidence do not 
apply, meaning that the government may use virtually any and all relevant 
evidence, including evidence alleged to have been obtained unlawfully.167
F. Appeals and Periodic Review 
Most preventive detention systems provide for rights of appeal and 
periodic automatic review of detention. For example, under the British Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act, all persons subject to control orders have a right 
of appeal on matters of law.168 Under the ATRC provisions in U.S. law, 
removable aliens may appeal the removal determination to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, and in cases involving permanent legal residents the appeal is au-
tomatic.169 The standard of review is the same as in criminal proceedings—
de novo review for matters of law, and a clearly erroneous standard for fac-
tual matters.170
Automatic periodic review typically involves the same standard 
used to impose detention in the first instance, and usually occurs no less 
than once each year depending on the intrusiveness of the liberty restriction. 
In Israel, administrative detention orders must be reviewed by the court 
165 Other options that might be considered in place of such special counsel are a permanent 
staff of skilled defense lawyers similar to the Federal Public Defender system, as proposed 
by Professors Goldsmith and Katyal, Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terror-
ists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, or a system of pre-clearance for lawyers who 
are not associated with the government but who are experienced human rights practitioners. 
166 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (2001). 
167 Id.
168 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, § 11 (Eng.). 
169 8 U.S.C. § 1535 (1996). 
170 Id.
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every three months.171 In Britain, there is no automatic periodic review dur-
ing the course of the order, but the order must be affirmatively renewed at 
the end of each period for it to continue in effect.172  Persons subject to con-
trol orders may seek revocation or modification of the order either from the 
government (non-derogating orders) or the court (derogating orders).173
Moreover, the government may revoke or relax a non-derogating control 
order at any time, and the court is obligated to revoke a derogating control 
order if the derogating restrictions are no longer required.174
G. Reporting and Oversight 
Preventive detention systems also tend to impose oversight and re-
porting obligations on an appropriate independent authority, such as an In-
spector General.175 These provisions usually require periodic evaluation of 
the use of the preventive detention powers, the outcome of the detention 
proceedings, the nature and conditions of the detention imposed, and any 
other material matters associated with the preventive detention program.176
Reports normally must be submitted to a responsible executive agent (such 
as a Minister of Justice or State) and to a designated legislative commit-
tee.177
For example, in Australia the Attorney General must make an an-
nual report to the Parliament regarding the functioning of the Act, including 
the number of orders issued and people detained, the nature of complaints 
made by those detained, and the number of detention orders found invalid 
by a court, among other issues.178 The British scheme has several periodic 
reporting and oversight provisions.  For example, the Secretary of State 
must provide a report to Parliament on a quarterly basis detailing his use of 
the control order powers and appoint an independent reviewer to report on 
the operation of the Act and other related matters.179
171 Israel’s Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978–99), reprinted in 
Gross, supra note 121, at 775.   
172 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 4 (Eng.). 
173 See id. § 7. 
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., id. § 14. 
176 See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.47, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
177 E.g. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 14 (Eng.). 
178 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.47, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
179 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 14 (Eng.). 
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H. Sunset Provisions 
Preventive detention systems may be subject to a legislative sunset 
provision that requires the systems to cease operation unless reauthorized.180
The sunset provisions, however, vary significantly. For example, the control 
order provisions of the British Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 must be 
reauthorized annually, subject to approval by the British Parliament.181 By 
contrast, the Australian law has a 10-year sunset clause.182
CONCLUSION
The U.S.’s current multi-prong approach to detention of terrorist 
suspects has a number of strengths. Its central strength is that it takes advan-
tage of every legal tool available and attempts to use those tools that best fit 
the particular situation. It is, in short, fact driven and adaptive. Moreover, 
the U.S. approach relies on doctrines and powers that have lengthy pedi-
grees in U.S. jurisprudence. The detention of material witnesses, for exam-
ple, dates from Sixteenth Century England and has been permitted under 
U.S. law since the first Judiciary Act of 1789.183 The prosecution of well-
established lesser offenses such as obstruction of justice and document 
fraud proved a valuable law enforcement tool in other contexts, such as the 
fight against organized crime. Similarly, the right of a nation to detain aliens 
that pose serious threats to national security is largely uncontroversial. And 
invocation of the right to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hos-
tilities under LOAC is, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hamdi, “by 
universal agreement and practice [an] important incident[] of war.”184
Nevertheless, the current approach also has many weaknesses. 
There is growing concern that these law enforcement, immigration and 
LOAC doctrines are being stressed beyond their limit.185  Indeed, Attorney 
180 See, e.g., id. § 13; Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.53, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
181 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c.2, § 13 (Eng.). 
182 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2), 2005, § 105.53, sched. 4 (Austl.). 
183 Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or Denied?, 40 
WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1534–36 (1994) (explaining that the concept of material witnesses 
began in England in the 1500s); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) 
(“Recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify . . . may [be] require[d] on 
pain of punishment.”). 
184 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 518 (2004) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 
(1942)).
185 For instance, detention of material witnesses was conceived to compel individuals with 
relevant testimony to appear as witnesses; detention of material witnesses was not intended 
to be a proxy for preventive detention of those considered dangerous to society. See Stud-
nicki, supra note 183, at 1539–37. Because these warrants were conceived for short-term 
detention of witnesses, there are few procedural safeguards such as meaningful judicial re-
view or a robust ability to challenge the basis for detention. See id. at 1536–39. 
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General Mukasey and the other commentators previously cited seem to have 
reached just that conclusion, as did the Fourth Circuit panel in al-Marri.186
The pressure on traditional doctrines to accommodate the challenges of 
modern international terrorism tends to skew those doctrines in disturbing 
ways. There also is genuine concern in the legal community that the current 
approach damages our fundamental rights, and harms our international rela-
tionships—the very partnerships the United States must strengthen to effec-
tively defeat al Qaeda and its allies, as well as presently unknown or future 
terrorist organizations. 
These concerns warrant a call for the U.S. Congress to explore a 
new system of security detention for terrorism suspects. It is not entirely 
clear that a system of security detention for terrorist suspects would pass 
constitutional muster. Whether a sufficient nexus with terrorism would 
qualify as a constitutionally permissible “special justification” is largely an 
open question, and the adequacy of any procedural safeguards will depend 
on the totality of the specific provisions adopted. Further, for such a system 
to be of value, it must avoid becoming just one more tool used in the current 
ad hoc system.  Instead, it must clearly define when it applies and direct the 
executive and judicial branches to apply the system in cases that push the 
bounds of existing detention categories. This goal is not obviously achieva-
ble.187   
Moreover, there are countless possible variations on the preventive 
detention model that have not been discussed. For instance, a security deten-
tion system might concentrate preventive detention decisions, terrorism-
related criminal prosecutions, and other national security matters into spe-
cialized national security courts, as several commentators have previously 
suggested—a concept with its own set of concerns. However, this approach 
might serve to free ordinary criminal courts from the challenges of handling 
terrorism matters, and stimulate development of a cadre of investigators, 
prosecutors and judges experienced in terrorism and national security mat-
ters—similar to the system used in France and Spain, where terrorism cases 
are handled by centralized courts. Another variation could involve the adop-
tion of investigative hearing measures similar to those currently under con-
templation in Canada, which permit a court to compel the examination of 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 24, 37–43. 
187 For example, the U.S. government has asserted on several occasions that the President 
has inherent constitutional power to detain enemy combatants even in the absence of a con-
gressional authorization to use force such as the AUMF. Cf., e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513–15 
(2003) (discussing both the Government’s argument that the President’s war powers author-
ize detention of enemy combatants and skepticism that the Government requires a Congres-
sional authorization to detain enemy combatants). The courts have not yet fully resolved that 
question.
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any person reasonably believed to have information related to a terrorism 
matter.   
Let us be clear. We do not urge the consideration of such a system 
because we believe that the government officials who designed or operate 
under the current multi-prong approach are ill-motivated or purposely dis-
torting the legal authorities under which they operate. To the contrary, we 
believe the vast majority have acted in good faith and have done the best 
they can with, in the words of Attorney General Mukasey, “a strained and 
mismatched legal system.”188 If structured properly, a new security deten-
tion system might relieve the pressures currently distorting the existing de-
tention mechanisms and provide a more definite, regular, and widely ac-
cepted standard of detention in difficult terrorism cases. 
188 Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, 
at A15. 
